Abstract

This paper aims to explain first round demands for democratization and reforms defeat in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Taking the two examples of Sudan and Egypt, the paper argues that this round collided with the differences among the forces that sought change on the aspired change’s form and extent. In contrast, there was a clear unity among forces opposing to change who mobilized their external allies. This is added, of course, to the unprecedented violence this movement was faced by. Moreover, hostility and antagonism between the liberal and Islamic currents created a discrepancy that was vital for the continuation of the authoritarian regimes. The paper adopts a model of conflict approach and proposes to focus on the behavior of political organizations and parties as “political actors” in the course of a revolution because they represent focal points that witness intense interaction between political behavior from “below and from up”. In their pursuit of their seemingly irreconcilable interests, these political organizations constantly (re)position themselves and mobilize ideology, religion, political violence, government institutions, social and political movements and the economy. The paper is mostly based on secondary data in addition to the researchers' follow-up of the events in the last five years. It concludes that the political parties and organizations which have believed in, and sought, change have been deeply divided from the beginning and characterized by opportunism and constant tendencies to compromise on the process of political reforms it sought. That is why it was unable to invest in the sudden uprisings which sought to liquidate the authoritarian governments. These groups failed, more importantly, to form long-term blocs that would dismantle the ruling regimes and their alliances and advocate a better future to the masses that had already achieved an aborted change in Egypt and sought hard in Sudan.

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